RESILIENT POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING · NAV—4.10 · NFA PROFESSIONAL

GNSS Interference: Jamming, Spoofing and Resilient Navigation

Recognize corrupted navigation, protect the flight path and transition to independent sources with disciplined threat and error management.

Study index
  1. Jamming denies; spoofing deceives
  2. Automation accuracy is not navigation truth

Recognize corrupted navigation, protect the flight path and transition to independent sources with disciplined threat and error management.

DETECT → CROSS-CHECK → DISTRUST → REVERT → NAVIGATE → COMMUNICATE → VERIFY

01 — STUDY INTRODUCTION

Jamming denies; spoofing deceives

Jamming degrades or prevents legitimate GNSS reception. Spoofing can produce smooth, precise and convincing false position, velocity or timing information—and may therefore be more difficult to recognize.

Possible clues include disagreement with IRS, DME or ATC information; implausible groundspeed and wind; unexpected time changes; inconsistent runway geometry; and abnormal hybrid-position behavior.

02 — STUDY INTRODUCTION

Automation accuracy is not navigation truth

A correctly functioning autopilot can accurately follow an erroneous FMS trajectory. When position integrity is suspect, the first priority is to protect the flight path and cross-check independent information—not to chase the map.

Two GNSS receivers provide redundancy but can share the same RF threat. Resilience comes from technological diversity: trusted IRS, DME/DME, raw terrestrial references, ATC support and an independent landing system where available.

NFA PROFESSIONAL

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FOR PROFESSIONAL STUDY

Educational material. Not a replacement for manufacturer manuals, approved operator procedures, MEL/CDL, operational approvals, AIP/NOTAM or regulatory requirements.